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Would a Ban on Institutional SFR Ownership Actually Improve U.S. Housing Affordability? Proposals to restrict or ban institutional investors from purchasing single family homes have reentered the public conversation. The political narrative is simple and emotionally resonant. Large investors are blamed for crowding out everyday buyers, pushing prices higher, and worsening affordability. When examined through the lens of capital flows, liquidity, and housing supply, however, the economic impact of such a policy appears far more limited than advertised. At a national level, restricting institutional ownership would likely have minimal effect on affordability and could introduce unintended distortions across adjacent housing sectors. The United States has roughly 85 million single family homes. Institutional investors own only a small fraction of that total. The two largest publicly traded single family rental platforms together control approximately 150,000 homes, representing less than two tenths of one percent of national inventory. Even when expanding the definition to include private equity platforms, pension backed vehicles, and insurance capital, institutional ownership remains concentrated in a narrow set of metropolitan areas. Outside of select Sunbelt markets such as Austin or Charlotte, institutional investors account for a minimal share of single family rental stock. Housing prices are shaped locally, not nationally. Still, national affordability outcomes cannot meaningfully change when policy targets a participant that operates at the margins of total supply. At any given time, roughly three to six million homes are listed for sale across the country. Even under an extreme assumption where all institutional owners liquidated simultaneously, those homes would represent only a modest share of available listings. Any resulting price impact would likely be temporary and geographically concentrated. In practice, even markets with higher institutional presence such as Charlotte, Phoenix, Dallas, Austin, or Tampa would likely see only modest declines, perhaps five to ten percent at most. That assumes perfect coordination and no offsetting demand, both of which are unrealistic. Housing markets function on liquidity. Buyers and sellers must be willing to transact. Capital must be available at reasonable terms. When liquidity declines, volatility increases and pricing becomes less stable. Institutional investors, regardless of public perception, provide consistent liquidity. They transact through cycles. They underwrite based on yield rather than emotion. They often absorb inventory during periods when individual buyers pull back. Restricting institutional participation does not remove capital from the system. It alters the market’s risk profile. Reduced liquidity leads to wider bid ask spreads, higher perceived risk, and a higher cost of capital for builders and developers. That higher cost does not disappear. It is ultimately passed through in the form of higher rents, higher home prices, or reduced construction activity. If institutional buyers are restricted from acquiring scattered site single family homes, capital will not sit idle. It will migrate toward structures that remain permissible and scalable. Stabilized rental portfolios become more attractive. Purpose built rental communities draw increased attention. Multifamily assets with single family characteristics absorb additional demand. This redirection of capital would likely push valuations higher in these segments. A policy designed to curb investor influence in one part of the market may unintentionally inflate prices in others. Build for rent communities are particularly well positioned in this scenario. They offer operational efficiency, regulatory clarity, and institutional scale. As competition increases, yields compress and replacement costs rise, making new housing more expensive to deliver. In this way, a ban could create a construction drag by shifting capital away from for sale housing while simultaneously increasing the cost of producing new rental supply. The most powerful force restricting housing supply today is mortgage lock in. Roughly eighty percent of homeowners hold mortgages at four percent or lower, with many locked near three percent. At current borrowing costs, selling often means doubling monthly debt service. Even households looking to downsize face higher payments. As a result, existing owners choose not to sell. This dynamic has dramatically reduced resale inventory and supported prices despite affordability challenges. Restricting institutional buyers does nothing to address this structural bottleneck. One of the most effective demand side interventions would be the widespread adoption of transferable or assumable mortgages. Allowing buyers to inherit existing low rate debt would unlock supply, improve transaction volume, and relieve pricing pressure without distorting capital flows. Rents respond to household formation, supply growth, and replacement cost. They do not decline simply because ownership changes hands. If institutional ownership is restricted while new supply remains constrained, rents are unlikely to fall. In many markets, rents could rise modestly as higher capital costs are passed through and professional operators retreat. Without a material increase in housing units, rental affordability remains challenged. A realistic forecast points to limited national impact. Certain markets with high institutional concentration may experience short term volatility, but any adjustment is likely to be measured rather than dramatic. At the same time, sectors absorbing displaced capital such as build for rent communities or stabilized rental portfolios could see upward pricing pressure. Home prices ultimately reflect supply relative to household demand. Policies that fail to materially increase supply rarely generate sustained price relief. For those building housing products, the signal is clear. Long term affordability is driven by supply creation, not ownership restrictions. New housing of all forms remains structurally undersupplied. Projects that deliver density, efficiency, and speed to market will remain advantaged. Build for rent and purpose built rental communities are likely beneficiaries of redirected capital. Development strategies should anticipate rising land values and stronger institutional exit demand in these segments. Ownership enabling products deserve renewed focus. Structures that help households access low cost debt or transition from renting to owning align more closely with the true constraints of the market. Capital efficient design will matter more than ever. Smaller units, higher density, modular construction, and flexible zoning strategies offer resilience in an environment where the cost of capital remains elevated. A ban on institutional single family home ownership may satisfy a political narrative, but it does little to address the core mechanics of housing affordability. Institutional investors own too small a share of the market to move national outcomes. Liquidity would decline. Capital would reallocate. Supply constraints would persist. Without policies that unlock mobility, expand supply, and reduce financing friction, affordability challenges will remain largely unchanged. For developers and operators, the opportunity lies not in reacting to headlines, but in building the housing the market structurally lacks. And that is exactly what we at Alpha Equity Group are doing, very carefully, while providing investors with peace of mind through downside protected investments.
Why Building and Holding Real Estate for the Long- Term Delivers Superior, Tax-Efficient Yield
Rent Control: A Well-Intentioned Policy That Misses the Mark In the debate over affordable housing, few policies stir as much emotion—or controversy—as rent control. Advocates see it as a way to shield tenants from rising rents. Critics argue it does more harm than good. When you examine the economic evidence and real- world outcomes, the conclusion becomes clear: rent control is a deeply flawed solution to a real problem. What Is Rent Control? Rent control is a policy that limits how much landlords can increase rent, either through caps tied to inflation or fixed annual percentages. On paper, it sounds compassionate: protect renters from displacement and make cities more affordable. But in practice, rent control reduces the supply of available housing, discourages new development, and often hurts the very people it's meant to help. Why Rent Control Backfires 1. It Discourages New Construction Developers are less likely to build in markets where future rent growth—and thus returns—are capped. Why take the risk of developing multifamily housing in a city where your upside is limited and your operating environment is politicized? 2. It Drives Property Owners Out of the Market Faced with strict rent regulations, landlords may convert rental units to condos or remove them from the market altogether. Fewer units mean more scarcity, which ultimately drives prices higher for everyone else. 3. It Distorts Housing Allocation Rent control encourages long-term tenants to stay in apartments they might otherwise outgrow or vacate. This locks up valuable housing stock and prevents more dynamic turnover, often freezing lower-cost units in place for higher-income tenants. 4. It Creates a Two-Tiered Market Markets with rent control often develop into two separate ecosystems: regulated apartments that are underpriced and hard to find, and unregulated units with inflated prices to compensate for suppressed supply. The California–New York Split: A Tale of Two Approaches Historically, California and New York have been peers in over-regulating rental housing. But recently, they’ve taken different paths: California's Recent Steps Forward: Voters rejected rent control expansion (Prop 21 and earlier Prop 10) Streamlined approvals and reduced CEQA abuse to promote new development New York's Recent Moves Backward: Passed “Good Cause Eviction” law—effectively rent control in disguise Political calls for rent freezes and demonization of landlords If you’re an open-minded apartment developer evaluating both markets today, California’s message is increasingly: We need you. New York’s? Not so much. To be fair, both are still difficult places to build housing, and cities like Los Angeles and Berkeley remain deeply anti-development. But California has shown progress by recognizing that you can’t claim to be pro-housing while simultaneously vilifying those who create and operate it. A Misalignment of Incentives A core problem with rent control is that it treats housing supply as fixed and ignores the private sector's role in expanding it. If developers and operators are stripped of potential upside—and burdened with unpredictable political risk—they simply stop building. Even well-intentioned pro-development plans (like NYC’s "City oare undermined when operators believe they’ll be punished after delivery through hostile regulation or public scorn. You can't be truly pro-development unless you're also pro-operator. Policies that foster collaboration, not scapegoating, create the conditions for long-term affordability. The Real Way Forward Instead of imposing artificial caps, cities should focus on increasing housing supply through zoning reform, expedited approvals, and public-private partnerships. The more units that come online, the more pricing power shifts away from landlords and toward tenants—naturally. Rent control is seductive in its simplicity but devastating in its consequences. It’s a policy that tries to solve a supply problem with demand-side restrictions—and in doing so, it often makes things worse. At Alpha Equity Group, we believe that smart, sustainable development is the key to housing affordability. And that requires sound economics, not political theater.
Capital Markets
Would a Ban on Institutional SFR Ownership Actually Improve U.S. Housing Affordability? Proposals to restrict or ban institutional investors from purchasing single family homes have reentered the public conversation. The political narrative is simple and emotionally resonant. Large investors are blamed for crowding out everyday buyers, pushing prices higher, and worsening affordability. When examined through the lens of capital flows, liquidity, and housing supply, however, the economic impact of such a policy appears far more limited than advertised. At a national level, restricting institutional ownership would likely have minimal effect on affordability and could introduce unintended distortions across adjacent housing sectors. The United States has roughly 85 million single family homes. Institutional investors own only a small fraction of that total. The two largest publicly traded single family rental platforms together control approximately 150,000 homes, representing less than two tenths of one percent of national inventory. Even when expanding the definition to include private equity platforms, pension backed vehicles, and insurance capital, institutional ownership remains concentrated in a narrow set of metropolitan areas. Outside of select Sunbelt markets such as Austin or Charlotte, institutional investors account for a minimal share of single family rental stock. Housing prices are shaped locally, not nationally. Still, national affordability outcomes cannot meaningfully change when policy targets a participant that operates at the margins of total supply. At any given time, roughly three to six million homes are listed for sale across the country. Even under an extreme assumption where all institutional owners liquidated simultaneously, those homes would represent only a modest share of available listings. Any resulting price impact would likely be temporary and geographically concentrated. In practice, even markets with higher institutional presence such as Charlotte, Phoenix, Dallas, Austin, or Tampa would likely see only modest declines, perhaps five to ten percent at most. That assumes perfect coordination and no offsetting demand, both of which are unrealistic. Housing markets function on liquidity. Buyers and sellers must be willing to transact. Capital must be available at reasonable terms. When liquidity declines, volatility increases and pricing becomes less stable. Institutional investors, regardless of public perception, provide consistent liquidity. They transact through cycles. They underwrite based on yield rather than emotion. They often absorb inventory during periods when individual buyers pull back. Restricting institutional participation does not remove capital from the system. It alters the market’s risk profile. Reduced liquidity leads to wider bid ask spreads, higher perceived risk, and a higher cost of capital for builders and developers. That higher cost does not disappear. It is ultimately passed through in the form of higher rents, higher home prices, or reduced construction activity. If institutional buyers are restricted from acquiring scattered site single family homes, capital will not sit idle. It will migrate toward structures that remain permissible and scalable. Stabilized rental portfolios become more attractive. Purpose built rental communities draw increased attention. Multifamily assets with single family characteristics absorb additional demand. This redirection of capital would likely push valuations higher in these segments. A policy designed to curb investor influence in one part of the market may unintentionally inflate prices in others. Build for rent communities are particularly well positioned in this scenario. They offer operational efficiency, regulatory clarity, and institutional scale. As competition increases, yields compress and replacement costs rise, making new housing more expensive to deliver. In this way, a ban could create a construction drag by shifting capital away from for sale housing while simultaneously increasing the cost of producing new rental supply. The most powerful force restricting housing supply today is mortgage lock in. Roughly eighty percent of homeowners hold mortgages at four percent or lower, with many locked near three percent. At current borrowing costs, selling often means doubling monthly debt service. Even households looking to downsize face higher payments. As a result, existing owners choose not to sell. This dynamic has dramatically reduced resale inventory and supported prices despite affordability challenges. Restricting institutional buyers does nothing to address this structural bottleneck. One of the most effective demand side interventions would be the widespread adoption of transferable or assumable mortgages. Allowing buyers to inherit existing low rate debt would unlock supply, improve transaction volume, and relieve pricing pressure without distorting capital flows. Rents respond to household formation, supply growth, and replacement cost. They do not decline simply because ownership changes hands. If institutional ownership is restricted while new supply remains constrained, rents are unlikely to fall. In many markets, rents could rise modestly as higher capital costs are passed through and professional operators retreat. Without a material increase in housing units, rental affordability remains challenged. A realistic forecast points to limited national impact. Certain markets with high institutional concentration may experience short term volatility, but any adjustment is likely to be measured rather than dramatic. At the same time, sectors absorbing displaced capital such as build for rent communities or stabilized rental portfolios could see upward pricing pressure. Home prices ultimately reflect supply relative to household demand. Policies that fail to materially increase supply rarely generate sustained price relief. For those building housing products, the signal is clear. Long term affordability is driven by supply creation, not ownership restrictions. New housing of all forms remains structurally undersupplied. Projects that deliver density, efficiency, and speed to market will remain advantaged. Build for rent and purpose built rental communities are likely beneficiaries of redirected capital. Development strategies should anticipate rising land values and stronger institutional exit demand in these segments. Ownership enabling products deserve renewed focus. Structures that help households access low cost debt or transition from renting to owning align more closely with the true constraints of the market. Capital efficient design will matter more than ever. Smaller units, higher density, modular construction, and flexible zoning strategies offer resilience in an environment where the cost of capital remains elevated. A ban on institutional single family home ownership may satisfy a political narrative, but it does little to address the core mechanics of housing affordability. Institutional investors own too small a share of the market to move national outcomes. Liquidity would decline. Capital would reallocate. Supply constraints would persist. Without policies that unlock mobility, expand supply, and reduce financing friction, affordability challenges will remain largely unchanged. For developers and operators, the opportunity lies not in reacting to headlines, but in building the housing the market structurally lacks. And that is exactly what we at Alpha Equity Group are doing, very carefully, while providing investors with peace of mind through downside protected investments.
Why Building and Holding Real Estate for the Long- Term Delivers Superior, Tax-Efficient Yield
In the world of capital markets, clarity is often fleeting — and today, it feels downright elusive. The Federal Reserve’s latest June dot plot offered little in the way of certainty. While the median projection sees the Federal Funds Rate in the mid-3% range by the end of 2026 , the dispersion among voting members is striking. Seven members predict no rate cuts in 2024 , reflecting just how divided the committee remains in the face of conflicting data. This latest update marks a 25-50 basis point shift downward from May , but the overarching theme is one of caution, not conviction. That sentiment is mirrored in the economic projections. Core PCE inflation , the Fed’s preferred inflation measure, is now expected to end 2025 at 3.0% , 30 basis points higher than earlier forecasts. Meanwhile, real GDP is forecast to slow from 2.3% in Q4 2024 to just 1.7% in 2025 — another sign that the lagged effects of monetary policy are expected to begin to show. At the same time, the Fed’s balance sheet has shrunk dramatically, from a peak of $9 trillion in April 2022 to just $2.3 trillion today . That quantitative tightening, coupled with a lack of consistent inflation suppression, leaves both equity and bond markets vulnerable to further volatility. This all feeds into an uncomfortable truth: rates are likely to remain higher for longer , and the market is struggling to price that reality. The VIX index , a 30-day forward-looking gauge of volatility in equities, is trending higher. When volatility rises even as indices fall, credit spreads widen , liquidity tightens, and financing risk surges. For commercial real estate investors , this has enormous implications. As we explored in our recent article on CRE Price Discovery , the market remains in flux. The bid-ask spread in real estate is still somewhat wide, and most transaction activity today is being driven by maturing debt — not opportunistic investments banking on future growth. This means valuations are being forced downward, especially for assets that were purchased or refinanced at ultra-low rates in 2021–2022. Consumer behavior is also in transition. Household formation is slowing, and personal savings rates are slowly ticking up although they are significantly down from longer term averages – which could reflect folks bracing for economic turbulence. U.S. household formation currently stands at 1.058 million, down 7.68% from last month’s 1.146 million and down 47.73% from 2.024 million a year ago. Looking globally, demand for U.S. Treasuries remains a critical economic indicator that has trickling effects on the economy . A strong bid-to-cover ratio — like the 2.67x seen at the June 11th 10-Year Treasury auction , with nearly 88% of bids from foreign banks — is encouraging. It suggests continued faith in U.S. fiscal credibility and currency strength despite market apprehensions in our strength, such as the US credit rating being downgraded by Moody’s. This equilibrium is rather fragile. Should the U.S. continue to run massive budget deficits with a debt-to-GDP ratio north of 120% , investors may begin to demand higher yields — or worse, seek refuge in alternative stores of value. Gold is one such store. The World Gold Council recently reported that 76% of central banks expect to increase their gold holdings over the next five years , up from 69% in 2023. This flight to real assets reflects growing concern about the long-term value of fiat currencies — and a desire to hedge against systemic risk. The Bottom Line Rates are likely to remain high through 2025 and into 2026 Inflation remains persistent but progress has been unclear Growth is slowing, and volatility is rising Real estate is repricing around debt maturity events Global capital is shifting cautiously, looking for safety At Alpha Equity Group, we believe this is a time for discipline, not risk-taking. We’re staying patient, watching the data, and investing defensively — focusing on secured debt positions and capital preservation. While others chase uncertain upside, we’re building long-term value through downside protection while we wait out the convergence of dozens of factors completely outside our control.
Real Estate Investing 101
The fundamental need for housing is universal—everyone requires a roof over their head. In the United States, however, we are facing a significant shortage of housing. According to the National Multifamily Housing Council, an additional 4.3 million units will be needed by 2035 to meet growing demand. Much of this demand is driven by migration to expanding lower cost cities and away from high tax, high cost metros, a trend accelerated by the widespread adoption of remote work during the pandemic. This trend has reshaped the housing landscape, creating a compelling opportunity for investors. While there are numerous investment strategies available, each with its own set of risks, residential real estate stands out. Over the past three decades, multifamily rentals have consistently delivered the highest risk-adjusted returns in commercial real estate. Why? Because housing is an essential need, regardless of economic conditions. At AEG, we are strategically developing both for-sale and rental housing, allowing us to adapt our approach to changing market dynamics and maximize returns while mitigating risk. Here’s why we are confident in the strength of residential housing as an investment: Land is Finite: Unlike many other asset classes, land cannot be created or expanded. The supply is fixed, and the demand for housing continues to grow. In the foreseeable future, virtual spaces like the metaverse will not replace the fundamental human need for physical shelter. Residential Housing is Non-Discretionary, and It's Supported by Government Liquidity: Housing is the only non-discretionary asset class. If it weren’t, we would see similar government support for other sectors like retail, office, or industrial real estate, but we don't. The federal government provides liquidity to the multifamily housing market because it is a fundamental need. This support drives down the weighted average cost of capital (WACC), making housing assets attractive to investors. This consistent access to capital compresses cap rates, creating a floor on the market (to an extent), fueling long-term growth and demand from investors big and small. Rents Tract with Inflation, and It is Rare to See Negative National Rent Growth: Rents reset every year as cost increases are passed off to tenants via annual lease contract resets. Since the beginning of recorded history, national rents have only gone negative year over year three times: the Spanish flu of 1918, the Great Financial Crisis, and during the Covid-19 pandemic. While yearly gains in rental cashflow streams will not make you wealthy, they are without a doubt very stable cashflows, historically speaking. There is no similar liquidity for for-sale housing, but its non-discretionary nature still gives it a strong investment profile. In growth markets like South Carolina's tertiary cities, the influx of new residents is fueling demand across all price points, further strengthening the residential sector. We believe in our residential investment thesis for both macro and local fundamental reasons. If interest rates remain high, new construction will slow even further. Meanwhile, homes in desirable locations will remain in high demand as many homeowners—especially those with low-rate mortgages—are unlikely to sell. According to the latest third-quarter data from the FHFA, 73.3% of U.S. mortgage borrowers now have an interest rate below 5.0%, a decline of 12.2 percentage points since Q1 2022. This significant shift in mortgage rates creates a unique dynamic: many homeowners are effectively "locked in" to their current homes, preventing them from moving and creating a looser supply in the for-sale market. As a result, home prices are expected to remain elevated in high-demand areas. While values may remain relatively flat in real terms over the next few years, on a nominal basis, they are expected to rise, particularly in growing markets. If interest rates decrease or economic growth drives up rental demand, build-for-rent communities could become more viable. However, they are not yet penciling out as attractive investments because growth has stalled - but, that is about to reverse. Thanks to our strategy and access to land—often without burdening our balance sheet or stretching our resources—we are able to remain nimble and pivot towards the most attractive risk-adjusted yields. As we navigate an uncertain economic environment, several factors support the ongoing strength of the residential housing market: slow housing starts, higher interest rates, and a large percentage of homeowners sitting on mortgages with sub-4% rates. These dynamics, along with strong demand in high-growth areas, reinforce our belief that residential real estate will remain a compelling investment in the years to come. At AEG, our focus is on developing attainable, high-quality housing, from custom spec homes, to mini-farm tracts, to higher density townhome projects. This flexibility allows us to serve a wide range of income levels and tailor our strategy to market conditions. With a commitment to quality finishes and high end products, we appeal to buyers regardless of economic conditions, providing us with a tighter, more predictable cash conversion and days on market cycle, unlike some of our competitors. By seeking out individually parceled deals, we reduce overall risk and remain agile in our decision-making.
Valuations & Investment Psychology
What is Negative Leverage?
Market Monitor
Would a Ban on Institutional SFR Ownership Actually Improve U.S. Housing Affordability? Proposals to restrict or ban institutional investors from purchasing single family homes have reentered the public conversation. The political narrative is simple and emotionally resonant. Large investors are blamed for crowding out everyday buyers, pushing prices higher, and worsening affordability. When examined through the lens of capital flows, liquidity, and housing supply, however, the economic impact of such a policy appears far more limited than advertised. At a national level, restricting institutional ownership would likely have minimal effect on affordability and could introduce unintended distortions across adjacent housing sectors. The United States has roughly 85 million single family homes. Institutional investors own only a small fraction of that total. The two largest publicly traded single family rental platforms together control approximately 150,000 homes, representing less than two tenths of one percent of national inventory. Even when expanding the definition to include private equity platforms, pension backed vehicles, and insurance capital, institutional ownership remains concentrated in a narrow set of metropolitan areas. Outside of select Sunbelt markets such as Austin or Charlotte, institutional investors account for a minimal share of single family rental stock. Housing prices are shaped locally, not nationally. Still, national affordability outcomes cannot meaningfully change when policy targets a participant that operates at the margins of total supply. At any given time, roughly three to six million homes are listed for sale across the country. Even under an extreme assumption where all institutional owners liquidated simultaneously, those homes would represent only a modest share of available listings. Any resulting price impact would likely be temporary and geographically concentrated. In practice, even markets with higher institutional presence such as Charlotte, Phoenix, Dallas, Austin, or Tampa would likely see only modest declines, perhaps five to ten percent at most. That assumes perfect coordination and no offsetting demand, both of which are unrealistic. Housing markets function on liquidity. Buyers and sellers must be willing to transact. Capital must be available at reasonable terms. When liquidity declines, volatility increases and pricing becomes less stable. Institutional investors, regardless of public perception, provide consistent liquidity. They transact through cycles. They underwrite based on yield rather than emotion. They often absorb inventory during periods when individual buyers pull back. Restricting institutional participation does not remove capital from the system. It alters the market’s risk profile. Reduced liquidity leads to wider bid ask spreads, higher perceived risk, and a higher cost of capital for builders and developers. That higher cost does not disappear. It is ultimately passed through in the form of higher rents, higher home prices, or reduced construction activity. If institutional buyers are restricted from acquiring scattered site single family homes, capital will not sit idle. It will migrate toward structures that remain permissible and scalable. Stabilized rental portfolios become more attractive. Purpose built rental communities draw increased attention. Multifamily assets with single family characteristics absorb additional demand. This redirection of capital would likely push valuations higher in these segments. A policy designed to curb investor influence in one part of the market may unintentionally inflate prices in others. Build for rent communities are particularly well positioned in this scenario. They offer operational efficiency, regulatory clarity, and institutional scale. As competition increases, yields compress and replacement costs rise, making new housing more expensive to deliver. In this way, a ban could create a construction drag by shifting capital away from for sale housing while simultaneously increasing the cost of producing new rental supply. The most powerful force restricting housing supply today is mortgage lock in. Roughly eighty percent of homeowners hold mortgages at four percent or lower, with many locked near three percent. At current borrowing costs, selling often means doubling monthly debt service. Even households looking to downsize face higher payments. As a result, existing owners choose not to sell. This dynamic has dramatically reduced resale inventory and supported prices despite affordability challenges. Restricting institutional buyers does nothing to address this structural bottleneck. One of the most effective demand side interventions would be the widespread adoption of transferable or assumable mortgages. Allowing buyers to inherit existing low rate debt would unlock supply, improve transaction volume, and relieve pricing pressure without distorting capital flows. Rents respond to household formation, supply growth, and replacement cost. They do not decline simply because ownership changes hands. If institutional ownership is restricted while new supply remains constrained, rents are unlikely to fall. In many markets, rents could rise modestly as higher capital costs are passed through and professional operators retreat. Without a material increase in housing units, rental affordability remains challenged. A realistic forecast points to limited national impact. Certain markets with high institutional concentration may experience short term volatility, but any adjustment is likely to be measured rather than dramatic. At the same time, sectors absorbing displaced capital such as build for rent communities or stabilized rental portfolios could see upward pricing pressure. Home prices ultimately reflect supply relative to household demand. Policies that fail to materially increase supply rarely generate sustained price relief. For those building housing products, the signal is clear. Long term affordability is driven by supply creation, not ownership restrictions. New housing of all forms remains structurally undersupplied. Projects that deliver density, efficiency, and speed to market will remain advantaged. Build for rent and purpose built rental communities are likely beneficiaries of redirected capital. Development strategies should anticipate rising land values and stronger institutional exit demand in these segments. Ownership enabling products deserve renewed focus. Structures that help households access low cost debt or transition from renting to owning align more closely with the true constraints of the market. Capital efficient design will matter more than ever. Smaller units, higher density, modular construction, and flexible zoning strategies offer resilience in an environment where the cost of capital remains elevated. A ban on institutional single family home ownership may satisfy a political narrative, but it does little to address the core mechanics of housing affordability. Institutional investors own too small a share of the market to move national outcomes. Liquidity would decline. Capital would reallocate. Supply constraints would persist. Without policies that unlock mobility, expand supply, and reduce financing friction, affordability challenges will remain largely unchanged. For developers and operators, the opportunity lies not in reacting to headlines, but in building the housing the market structurally lacks. And that is exactly what we at Alpha Equity Group are doing, very carefully, while providing investors with peace of mind through downside protected investments.
Multifamily Housing and Risk-Adjusted Returns
Lennar Files for Public Land-Banking REIT Subsidiary
Advanced Investing Topics
Why Building and Holding Real Estate for the Long- Term Delivers Superior, Tax-Efficient Yield
Rent Control: A Well-Intentioned Policy That Misses the Mark In the debate over affordable housing, few policies stir as much emotion—or controversy—as rent control. Advocates see it as a way to shield tenants from rising rents. Critics argue it does more harm than good. When you examine the economic evidence and real- world outcomes, the conclusion becomes clear: rent control is a deeply flawed solution to a real problem. What Is Rent Control? Rent control is a policy that limits how much landlords can increase rent, either through caps tied to inflation or fixed annual percentages. On paper, it sounds compassionate: protect renters from displacement and make cities more affordable. But in practice, rent control reduces the supply of available housing, discourages new development, and often hurts the very people it's meant to help. Why Rent Control Backfires 1. It Discourages New Construction Developers are less likely to build in markets where future rent growth—and thus returns—are capped. Why take the risk of developing multifamily housing in a city where your upside is limited and your operating environment is politicized? 2. It Drives Property Owners Out of the Market Faced with strict rent regulations, landlords may convert rental units to condos or remove them from the market altogether. Fewer units mean more scarcity, which ultimately drives prices higher for everyone else. 3. It Distorts Housing Allocation Rent control encourages long-term tenants to stay in apartments they might otherwise outgrow or vacate. This locks up valuable housing stock and prevents more dynamic turnover, often freezing lower-cost units in place for higher-income tenants. 4. It Creates a Two-Tiered Market Markets with rent control often develop into two separate ecosystems: regulated apartments that are underpriced and hard to find, and unregulated units with inflated prices to compensate for suppressed supply. The California–New York Split: A Tale of Two Approaches Historically, California and New York have been peers in over-regulating rental housing. But recently, they’ve taken different paths: California's Recent Steps Forward: Voters rejected rent control expansion (Prop 21 and earlier Prop 10) Streamlined approvals and reduced CEQA abuse to promote new development New York's Recent Moves Backward: Passed “Good Cause Eviction” law—effectively rent control in disguise Political calls for rent freezes and demonization of landlords If you’re an open-minded apartment developer evaluating both markets today, California’s message is increasingly: We need you. New York’s? Not so much. To be fair, both are still difficult places to build housing, and cities like Los Angeles and Berkeley remain deeply anti-development. But California has shown progress by recognizing that you can’t claim to be pro-housing while simultaneously vilifying those who create and operate it. A Misalignment of Incentives A core problem with rent control is that it treats housing supply as fixed and ignores the private sector's role in expanding it. If developers and operators are stripped of potential upside—and burdened with unpredictable political risk—they simply stop building. Even well-intentioned pro-development plans (like NYC’s "City oare undermined when operators believe they’ll be punished after delivery through hostile regulation or public scorn. You can't be truly pro-development unless you're also pro-operator. Policies that foster collaboration, not scapegoating, create the conditions for long-term affordability. The Real Way Forward Instead of imposing artificial caps, cities should focus on increasing housing supply through zoning reform, expedited approvals, and public-private partnerships. The more units that come online, the more pricing power shifts away from landlords and toward tenants—naturally. Rent control is seductive in its simplicity but devastating in its consequences. It’s a policy that tries to solve a supply problem with demand-side restrictions—and in doing so, it often makes things worse. At Alpha Equity Group, we believe that smart, sustainable development is the key to housing affordability. And that requires sound economics, not political theater.
In the world of capital markets, clarity is often fleeting — and today, it feels downright elusive. The Federal Reserve’s latest June dot plot offered little in the way of certainty. While the median projection sees the Federal Funds Rate in the mid-3% range by the end of 2026 , the dispersion among voting members is striking. Seven members predict no rate cuts in 2024 , reflecting just how divided the committee remains in the face of conflicting data. This latest update marks a 25-50 basis point shift downward from May , but the overarching theme is one of caution, not conviction. That sentiment is mirrored in the economic projections. Core PCE inflation , the Fed’s preferred inflation measure, is now expected to end 2025 at 3.0% , 30 basis points higher than earlier forecasts. Meanwhile, real GDP is forecast to slow from 2.3% in Q4 2024 to just 1.7% in 2025 — another sign that the lagged effects of monetary policy are expected to begin to show. At the same time, the Fed’s balance sheet has shrunk dramatically, from a peak of $9 trillion in April 2022 to just $2.3 trillion today . That quantitative tightening, coupled with a lack of consistent inflation suppression, leaves both equity and bond markets vulnerable to further volatility. This all feeds into an uncomfortable truth: rates are likely to remain higher for longer , and the market is struggling to price that reality. The VIX index , a 30-day forward-looking gauge of volatility in equities, is trending higher. When volatility rises even as indices fall, credit spreads widen , liquidity tightens, and financing risk surges. For commercial real estate investors , this has enormous implications. As we explored in our recent article on CRE Price Discovery , the market remains in flux. The bid-ask spread in real estate is still somewhat wide, and most transaction activity today is being driven by maturing debt — not opportunistic investments banking on future growth. This means valuations are being forced downward, especially for assets that were purchased or refinanced at ultra-low rates in 2021–2022. Consumer behavior is also in transition. Household formation is slowing, and personal savings rates are slowly ticking up although they are significantly down from longer term averages – which could reflect folks bracing for economic turbulence. U.S. household formation currently stands at 1.058 million, down 7.68% from last month’s 1.146 million and down 47.73% from 2.024 million a year ago. Looking globally, demand for U.S. Treasuries remains a critical economic indicator that has trickling effects on the economy . A strong bid-to-cover ratio — like the 2.67x seen at the June 11th 10-Year Treasury auction , with nearly 88% of bids from foreign banks — is encouraging. It suggests continued faith in U.S. fiscal credibility and currency strength despite market apprehensions in our strength, such as the US credit rating being downgraded by Moody’s. This equilibrium is rather fragile. Should the U.S. continue to run massive budget deficits with a debt-to-GDP ratio north of 120% , investors may begin to demand higher yields — or worse, seek refuge in alternative stores of value. Gold is one such store. The World Gold Council recently reported that 76% of central banks expect to increase their gold holdings over the next five years , up from 69% in 2023. This flight to real assets reflects growing concern about the long-term value of fiat currencies — and a desire to hedge against systemic risk. The Bottom Line Rates are likely to remain high through 2025 and into 2026 Inflation remains persistent but progress has been unclear Growth is slowing, and volatility is rising Real estate is repricing around debt maturity events Global capital is shifting cautiously, looking for safety At Alpha Equity Group, we believe this is a time for discipline, not risk-taking. We’re staying patient, watching the data, and investing defensively — focusing on secured debt positions and capital preservation. While others chase uncertain upside, we’re building long-term value through downside protection while we wait out the convergence of dozens of factors completely outside our control.
NEWS AND EVENTS
Michael Fernandez featured on "Think Big with Taylor Lyles" Podcast
Coker Creek Featured in the Post & Courier
Grand Re-Opening at Farmer’s Cove: A Celebration of Small-Space Living Our Grand Re-Opening was a huge success, and what an incredible day it was! T he re-opening event offered guests a chance to tour fresh new designs and floor plans from Clayton Park Models, meet future neighbors, and get a glimpse of what’s ahead for the community. Exciting amenity upgrades are on the horizon, including a dog park, community garden, and potentially a shared dock for residents to enjoy the peaceful waterside setting. On Saturday, October 11th, more than forty visitors joined us at Farmer’s Cove in Taylors, SC to explore our reimagined 74-unit tiny home community. Guests walked through stunning new models, toured fully furnished homes, and got a firsthand look at the thoughtful craftsmanship and creative layouts that make small-space living feel big. From cozy porches to open-concept kitchens, each design reflected our mission: to bring attainable, design-forward living to Upstate South Carolina. Families, first-time buyers, and curious neighbors alike left inspired — proof that less really can mean more. 📍 Farmer’s Cove 1390 Groce Meadow Rd, Taylors, SC Whether you missed it or just want to relive the day, stay tuned for upcoming tours and community events — there’s always something new happening at Farmer’s Cove! Check out the community here. Interested in reserving a new tiny in our community? Reserve a lot today by clicking here. → Explore the Community
FAQ
How do I get in touch with your team to discuss investing or if I have questions?
You can reach us in a few different ways:
- Email: invest@alphaequityre.com
- Submit a Form: navigate to our home page and click "Get Started"
- Book a Call: navigate to our home page and click "Book a Call"
Are returns guaranteed?
No returns are guaranteed and investors must be comfortable with the inherent risks associated with real estate investing. Stated projections are unlikely to come true in reality. Please head over to our resources section of our site to learn more about various investment risks.
How many offerings do you have per year?
Offerings can vary but broadly speaking, Alpha Equity may have anywhere from 2-4 equity investment opportunities per year. On the other hand, the Catalyst Strategic Credit Fund is a perpetual, evergreen debt offering. Please reach out to us to learn more about the current opportunities available.
What is your typical minimum investment?
The minimum investments for our offerings range from $50,000 to $100,000
Can I liquidate my investment whenever I want or do I have to wait?
Most investments offered are illiquid, and investors must hold their investment for the period specified in each offering. Catalyst Fund investors may request to liquidate their investments after a 12-month lock-up period, subject to the Manager’s discretion and other constraints specified in the offering’s PPM.
Can I invest if I am unaccredited?
Many of our offerings are for accredited investors only, however, we do have offerings open to unaccredited investors from time to time. Please schedule a call with us so we can better understand your goals.
How do I know if I am accredited?
Generally, you have to meet the following criteria to be considered accredited:
Have an individual net worth, or joint net worth with their spouse or spousal equivalent, that exceeds $1 million (excluding the value of your primary residence)
- Have individual income exceeding $200,000 in each of the past two financial years and a reasonable expectation of satisfying this requirement in the current year
- Have combined income with their spouse exceeding $300,000 in each of the past two financial years and a reasonable expectation of satisfying this requirement in the current year; or
- Hold a Series 7, Series 82 or Series 65 financial services license.
Is accreditation verification required to invest in your offerings?
Many of our offerings, including the Catalyst Strategic Credit Fund, fall within the SEC rule referred to as 506(c). In these cases, the rule requires that Alpha Equity verifies the accreditation status of investors. We can provide a letter that your CPA, attorney, or financial advisor can sign off on or alternatively, you can go to verifyinvestor.com and provide us with their verification documentation. Once an investor is verified, they will not need to re-verify themselves for a period of 5 years.
Once I invest, how do I track updates and the status of my investment?
Investors who have subscribed to one of our offerings will gain access to a private portal under Juniper Square, our investor management software. In your portal, you will be able to track your investment distributions, view reports, tax forms, and more. Once you invest with us once you will not have to make another account. All of your investments, as well as other open offerings, will live in your portal.
Do you charge fees in your offerings?
Yes. Our fees vary from offering to offering. Please refer to an offering's PPM for a full understanding of all fees associated with a particular investment.
