Negative Leverage


What is Negative Leverage?

Understanding Negative Leverage in the Current CRE Market


In commercial real estate (CRE), negative leverage occurs when a deal’s debt constant exceeds its unlevered rate of return. This concept has become increasingly relevant in today’s market, especially after the Federal Reserve raised interest rates 11 times in an attempt to control inflation, which was exacerbated by supply chain disruptions following the COVID-19 pandemic.


The Federal Reserve’s Rate Hike Cycle and Its Impact on Debt


The Fed’s interest rate hikes began in March 2022, when they increased the rate from 0% to 0.25-0.5%. By July 2023, the Fed Funds rate had risen to a range of 5.25-5.50%. The Fed Funds rate is crucial because it serves as the benchmark for floating rate loans and influences long-term rates across financial markets. This rate dictates borrowing costs, thereby impacting asset demand and capital flows in the global economy. When the Fed raises rates, borrowing becomes more expensive, which, in turn, affects the demand for assets traditionally financed with debt, such as real estate.


The Role of Debt and Equity in Real Estate Investing


In commercial real estate, investors often use debt (leverage) to enhance returns that they wouldn’t be able to achieve with equity alone. To understand how this works, it’s important to first grasp some basic financing principles. Real estate investments are often seen as an alternative to traditional vehicles like stocks, bonds, and cash. Investors looking to diversify their portfolios into real estate evaluate potential returns by assessing the financial performance of an asset and its submarket. They forecast future cash flows and use these projections to determine a target return that meets their investment goals. Capital in real estate deals typically comes from two sources: debt and equity. Debt is generally cheaper than equity because it carries less risk. Lenders, who are the providers of debt, are paid back first if a deal faces challenges, making their position less risky. Equity investors, on the other hand, bear a higher risk, including the possibility of total loss. For this reason, they expect a higher return on their investment.


Valuation and the Role of Cap Rates


To determine the value of a commercial real estate asset, investors look at its net operating income (NOI) — the income remaining after operating expenses have been paid. The NOI is divided by a capitalization rate (cap rate) to calculate the asset's value. The capitalization rate can be viewed as an inverse of the P/E ratio, or multiple on earnings.

Cap rates reflect the return an investor would expect from an all-cash purchase, without the influence of leverage. A higher cap rate generally signals a riskier investment, while a lower cap rate indicates a less risky investment. When investors add debt to the deal, they aim to generate a return that exceeds the cap rate and to measure this, they compare the debt constant (the interest rate adjusted for amortization) with the unlevered return (the cap rate).



The Impact of Rising Interest Rates on Property Values


The Federal Reserve's series of rate hikes has significantly impacted commercial real estate valuations by increasing the cost of debt. When debt becomes more expensive, the amount of leverage lenders are willing to provide decreases. Lenders typically require a debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.25x over the asset’s NOI. As interest rates rise, lenders reduce the loan amounts to ensure this cushion, which in turn lowers the loan-to-value ratio for the asset. This poses a significant problem in the current market: as leverage shrinks and asking prices remain relatively unchanged, equity must step in to fill the gap. Since equity investors demand higher returns than debt providers, this makes sellers’ old pricing expectations (when rates were much lower) more difficult for buyers to meet their required return thresholds.


The Disconnect Between Buyers and Sellers


Sellers, who have held onto asset values that were determined before the interest rate hikes, are now facing a market where buyers can’t justify these prices given the higher cost of debt. In many cases, debt constants are now higher than cap rates, resulting in negative leverage for most transactions. Buyers are unable to meet their return expectations because they cannot leverage debt in a way that makes sense under the current interest rate environment. As a result, there is a disconnect between sellers, who are reluctant to adjust their asking prices, and buyers, who are constrained by higher borrowing costs. While the gap between seller expectations and buyer offers has narrowed, it is clear that more adjustment is needed for transactions to occur on a broader scale.


What Needs to Happen for the Market to Move Forward?


For the CRE market to regain momentum, one of the following would need to ocurr:


  1. Price Reductions: Sellers may need to accept lower prices to align with buyers' expectations, making transactions viable once again.
  2. Interest Rate Reductions: If interest rates were to decrease, buyers could more easily meet their equity return expectations without requiring further price reductions.
  3. Increased Net Operating Income: A rise in NOI could help offset higher borrowing costs, potentially restoring positive leverage.


However, given the current economic cycle, options two and three appear unlikely to materialize soon. As a result, the most probable scenario is that prices will need to come down to facilitate transactions.


Looking Ahead: The Potential for Price Adjustments


As debt maturities increase, it is likely that more sellers will be forced to accept lower prices to avoid defaulting on their loans. These price reductions could help bring the market back into balance, enabling transactions to resume. The key challenge will be bridging the gap between seller expectations and buyer realities in an environment where higher interest rates and reduced leverage have fundamentally altered the dynamics of commercial real estate investing.


By Christian O'Neal January 29, 2026
Would a Ban on Institutional SFR Ownership Actually Improve U.S. Housing Affordability? Proposals to restrict or ban institutional investors from purchasing single family homes have reentered the public conversation. The political narrative is simple and emotionally resonant. Large investors are blamed for crowding out everyday buyers, pushing prices higher, and worsening affordability. When examined through the lens of capital flows, liquidity, and housing supply, however, the economic impact of such a policy appears far more limited than advertised. At a national level, restricting institutional ownership would likely have minimal effect on affordability and could introduce unintended distortions across adjacent housing sectors. The United States has roughly 85 million single family homes. Institutional investors own only a small fraction of that total. The two largest publicly traded single family rental platforms together control approximately 150,000 homes, representing less than two tenths of one percent of national inventory. Even when expanding the definition to include private equity platforms, pension backed vehicles, and insurance capital, institutional ownership remains concentrated in a narrow set of metropolitan areas. Outside of select Sunbelt markets such as Austin or Charlotte, institutional investors account for a minimal share of single family rental stock. Housing prices are shaped locally, not nationally. Still, national affordability outcomes cannot meaningfully change when policy targets a participant that operates at the margins of total supply. At any given time, roughly three to six million homes are listed for sale across the country. Even under an extreme assumption where all institutional owners liquidated simultaneously, those homes would represent only a modest share of available listings. Any resulting price impact would likely be temporary and geographically concentrated. In practice, even markets with higher institutional presence such as Charlotte, Phoenix, Dallas, Austin, or Tampa would likely see only modest declines, perhaps five to ten percent at most. That assumes perfect coordination and no offsetting demand, both of which are unrealistic. Housing markets function on liquidity. Buyers and sellers must be willing to transact. Capital must be available at reasonable terms. When liquidity declines, volatility increases and pricing becomes less stable. Institutional investors, regardless of public perception, provide consistent liquidity. They transact through cycles. They underwrite based on yield rather than emotion. They often absorb inventory during periods when individual buyers pull back. Restricting institutional participation does not remove capital from the system. It alters the market’s risk profile. Reduced liquidity leads to wider bid ask spreads, higher perceived risk, and a higher cost of capital for builders and developers. That higher cost does not disappear. It is ultimately passed through in the form of higher rents, higher home prices, or reduced construction activity. If institutional buyers are restricted from acquiring scattered site single family homes, capital will not sit idle. It will migrate toward structures that remain permissible and scalable. Stabilized rental portfolios become more attractive. Purpose built rental communities draw increased attention. Multifamily assets with single family characteristics absorb additional demand. This redirection of capital would likely push valuations higher in these segments. A policy designed to curb investor influence in one part of the market may unintentionally inflate prices in others. Build for rent communities are particularly well positioned in this scenario. They offer operational efficiency, regulatory clarity, and institutional scale. As competition increases, yields compress and replacement costs rise, making new housing more expensive to deliver. In this way, a ban could create a construction drag by shifting capital away from for sale housing while simultaneously increasing the cost of producing new rental supply. The most powerful force restricting housing supply today is mortgage lock in. Roughly eighty percent of homeowners hold mortgages at four percent or lower, with many locked near three percent. At current borrowing costs, selling often means doubling monthly debt service. Even households looking to downsize face higher payments. As a result, existing owners choose not to sell. This dynamic has dramatically reduced resale inventory and supported prices despite affordability challenges. Restricting institutional buyers does nothing to address this structural bottleneck. One of the most effective demand side interventions would be the widespread adoption of transferable or assumable mortgages. Allowing buyers to inherit existing low rate debt would unlock supply, improve transaction volume, and relieve pricing pressure without distorting capital flows. Rents respond to household formation, supply growth, and replacement cost. They do not decline simply because ownership changes hands. If institutional ownership is restricted while new supply remains constrained, rents are unlikely to fall. In many markets, rents could rise modestly as higher capital costs are passed through and professional operators retreat. Without a material increase in housing units, rental affordability remains challenged. A realistic forecast points to limited national impact. Certain markets with high institutional concentration may experience short term volatility, but any adjustment is likely to be measured rather than dramatic. At the same time, sectors absorbing displaced capital such as build for rent communities or stabilized rental portfolios could see upward pricing pressure. Home prices ultimately reflect supply relative to household demand. Policies that fail to materially increase supply rarely generate sustained price relief. For those building housing products, the signal is clear. Long term affordability is driven by supply creation, not ownership restrictions. New housing of all forms remains structurally undersupplied. Projects that deliver density, efficiency, and speed to market will remain advantaged. Build for rent and purpose built rental communities are likely beneficiaries of redirected capital. Development strategies should anticipate rising land values and stronger institutional exit demand in these segments. Ownership enabling products deserve renewed focus. Structures that help households access low cost debt or transition from renting to owning align more closely with the true constraints of the market. Capital efficient design will matter more than ever. Smaller units, higher density, modular construction, and flexible zoning strategies offer resilience in an environment where the cost of capital remains elevated. A ban on institutional single family home ownership may satisfy a political narrative, but it does little to address the core mechanics of housing affordability. Institutional investors own too small a share of the market to move national outcomes. Liquidity would decline. Capital would reallocate. Supply constraints would persist. Without policies that unlock mobility, expand supply, and reduce financing friction, affordability challenges will remain largely unchanged. For developers and operators, the opportunity lies not in reacting to headlines, but in building the housing the market structurally lacks. And that is exactly what we at Alpha Equity Group are doing, very carefully, while providing investors with peace of mind through downside protected investments.
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